{"formats":[{"name":"JSON","format":"json","url":"\/downloads\/2025\/code-json\/8.01-44.5.json"},{"name":"Plain Text","format":"text","url":"\/downloads\/2025\/code-text\/8.01-44.5.txt"},{"name":"XML","format":"xml","url":"\/downloads\/2025\/code-xml\/8.01-44.5.xml"},{"name":"HTML","format":"html","url":"\/downloads\/2025\/code-html\/8.01-44.5.html"}],"law_id":81010,"edition_id":1,"section_id":81010,"structure_id":12887,"section_number":"8.01-44.5","catch_line":"Punitive damages for persons injured by intoxicated drivers","history":"1994, c. 570; 1998, c. 722; 1999, c. 324; 2002, c. 879; 2013, c. 636; 2015, c. 710; 2016, cc. 510, 624; 2017, cc. 623, 671.","full_text":"In any action for personal injury or death arising from the operation of a motor vehicle, engine or train, the finder of fact may, in its discretion, award punitive damages to the plaintiff if the evidence proves that the defendant acted with malice toward the plaintiff or the defendant’s conduct was so willful or wanton as to show a conscious disregard for the rights of others.\n\t\tA defendant’s conduct shall be deemed sufficiently willful or wanton as to show a conscious disregard for the rights of others when the evidence proves that (i) when the incident causing the injury or death occurred, the defendant had a blood alcohol concentration of 0.15 percent or more by weight by volume or 0.15 grams or more per 210 liters of breath; (ii) at the time the defendant began drinking alcohol, or during the time he was drinking alcohol, he knew or should have known that his ability to operate a motor vehicle, engine or train would be impaired, or when he was operating a motor vehicle he knew or should have known that his ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired; and (iii) the defendant’s intoxication was a proximate cause of the injury to or death of the plaintiff. For the purposes of clause (i), it shall be rebuttably presumed that the blood alcohol concentration at the time of the incident causing injury or death was at least as high as the test result as shown in a certificate issued pursuant to \u00a7 18.2-268.9, in a certificate of analysis for a blood test administered pursuant to \u00a7 18.2-268.7, provided that the test was administered in accordance with the provisions of \u00a7\u00a7 18.2-268.1 through 18.2-268.12, or in a certificate of analysis for a test performed by the Department of Forensic Science on whole blood drawn pursuant to a search warrant, provided that the test was administered in accordance with the provisions of \u00a7\u00a7 18.2-268.5, 18.2-268.6, and 18.2-268.7. In addition to any other forms of proof, a party may submit a copy of a certificate issued pursuant to \u00a7 18.2-268.9, a certificate of analysis for a blood test administered pursuant to \u00a7 18.2-268.7, or a certificate of analysis for a test performed by the Department of Forensic Science on whole blood drawn pursuant to a search warrant, which shall be prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein and compliance with the applicable provisions of \u00a7\u00a7 18.2-268.1 through 18.2-268.12. For the purposes of clause (ii), it shall be rebuttably presumed that the defendant who has consumed alcohol knew or should have known that his ability to operate a motor vehicle, engine, or train was or would be impaired by such consumption of alcohol.\n\t\tHowever, when a defendant has unreasonably refused to submit to a test of his blood alcohol content as required by \u00a7 18.2-268.2, a defendant’s conduct shall be deemed sufficiently willful or wanton as to show a conscious disregard for the rights of others when the evidence proves that (a) when the incident causing the injury or death occurred the defendant was intoxicated, which may be established by evidence concerning the conduct or condition of the defendant; (b) at the time the defendant began drinking alcohol, during the time he was drinking alcohol, or when he was operating a motor vehicle, he knew or should have known that his ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired; and (c) the defendant’s intoxication was a proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff or death of the plaintiff’s decedent. In addition to any other forms of proof, a party may submit a certified copy of a court’s determination of unreasonable refusal pursuant to \u00a7 18.2-268.3, which shall be prima facie evidence that the defendant unreasonably refused to submit to the test. For the purposes of clause (b), it shall be rebuttably presumed that the defendant who has consumed alcohol knew or should have known that his ability to operate a motor vehicle, engine, or train was or would be impaired by such consumption of alcohol.\n\t\tEvidence of similar conduct by the same defendant subsequent to the date of the personal injury or death arising from the operation of a motor vehicle, engine, or train shall be admissible at trial for consideration by the jury or other finder of fact for the limited purpose of determining what amount of punitive damages may be appropriate to deter the defendant and others from similar future action.","order_by":null,"text":{"0":{"id":290387,"text":"In any action for personal injury or death arising from the operation of a motor vehicle, engine or train, the finder of fact may, in its discretion, award punitive damages to the plaintiff if the evidence proves that the defendant acted with malice toward the plaintiff or the defendant’s conduct was so willful or wanton as to show a conscious disregard for the rights of others.\n\t\tA defendant’s conduct shall be deemed sufficiently willful or wanton as to show a conscious disregard for the rights of others when the evidence proves that (i) when the incident causing the injury or death occurred, the defendant had a blood alcohol concentration of 0.15 percent or more by weight by volume or 0.15 grams or more per 210 liters of breath; (ii) at the time the defendant began drinking alcohol, or during the time he was drinking alcohol, he knew or should have known that his ability to operate a motor vehicle, engine or train would be impaired, or when he was operating a motor vehicle he knew or should have known that his ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired; and (iii) the defendant’s intoxication was a proximate cause of the injury to or death of the plaintiff. For the purposes of clause (i), it shall be rebuttably presumed that the blood alcohol concentration at the time of the incident causing injury or death was at least as high as the test result as shown in a certificate issued pursuant to \u00a7 18.2-268.9, in a certificate of analysis for a blood test administered pursuant to \u00a7 18.2-268.7, provided that the test was administered in accordance with the provisions of \u00a7\u00a7 18.2-268.1 through 18.2-268.12, or in a certificate of analysis for a test performed by the Department of Forensic Science on whole blood drawn pursuant to a search warrant, provided that the test was administered in accordance with the provisions of \u00a7\u00a7 18.2-268.5, 18.2-268.6, and 18.2-268.7. In addition to any other forms of proof, a party may submit a copy of a certificate issued pursuant to \u00a7 18.2-268.9, a certificate of analysis for a blood test administered pursuant to \u00a7 18.2-268.7, or a certificate of analysis for a test performed by the Department of Forensic Science on whole blood drawn pursuant to a search warrant, which shall be prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein and compliance with the applicable provisions of \u00a7\u00a7 18.2-268.1 through 18.2-268.12. For the purposes of clause (ii), it shall be rebuttably presumed that the defendant who has consumed alcohol knew or should have known that his ability to operate a motor vehicle, engine, or train was or would be impaired by such consumption of alcohol.\n\t\tHowever, when a defendant has unreasonably refused to submit to a test of his blood alcohol content as required by \u00a7 18.2-268.2, a defendant’s conduct shall be deemed sufficiently willful or wanton as to show a conscious disregard for the rights of others when the evidence proves that (a) when the incident causing the injury or death occurred the defendant was intoxicated, which may be established by evidence concerning the conduct or condition of the defendant; (b) at the time the defendant began drinking alcohol, during the time he was drinking alcohol, or when he was operating a motor vehicle, he knew or should have known that his ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired; and (c) the defendant’s intoxication was a proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff or death of the plaintiff’s decedent. In addition to any other forms of proof, a party may submit a certified copy of a court’s determination of unreasonable refusal pursuant to \u00a7 18.2-268.3, which shall be prima facie evidence that the defendant unreasonably refused to submit to the test. For the purposes of clause (b), it shall be rebuttably presumed that the defendant who has consumed alcohol knew or should have known that his ability to operate a motor vehicle, engine, or train was or would be impaired by such consumption of alcohol.\n\t\tEvidence of similar conduct by the same defendant subsequent to the date of the personal injury or death arising from the operation of a motor vehicle, engine, or train shall be admissible at trial for consideration by the jury or other finder of fact for the limited purpose of determining what amount of punitive damages may be appropriate to deter the defendant and others from similar future action.","type":"section","prefixes":[""],"prefix":"","entire_prefix":"","prefix_anchor":"","level":1}},"ancestry":[{"id":12887,"edition_id":1,"name":"Injury to Person or Property","identifier":"3","label":"article","depth":3,"order_by":1,"parent_id":12886,"metadata":{},"date_created":"2026-06-26 03:43:59","date_modified":"2026-06-26 03:43:59","permalink":{"id":280695,"object_type":"structure","relational_id":12887,"identifier":"3","token":"8.01\/3\/3","url":"\/8.01\/3\/3\/","edition_id":1,"permalink":0,"preferred":1}},{"id":12886,"edition_id":1,"name":"Actions","identifier":"3","label":"chapter","depth":2,"order_by":1,"parent_id":12747,"metadata":{},"date_created":"2026-06-26 03:43:59","date_modified":"2026-06-26 03:43:59","permalink":{"id":279635,"object_type":"structure","relational_id":12886,"identifier":"3","token":"8.01\/3","url":"\/8.01\/3\/","edition_id":1,"permalink":0,"preferred":1}},{"id":12747,"edition_id":1,"name":"Civil Remedies and Procedure","identifier":"8.01","label":"title","depth":1,"order_by":1,"parent_id":null,"metadata":{},"date_created":"2026-06-26 03:43:51","date_modified":"2026-06-26 03:43:51","permalink":{"id":277029,"object_type":"structure","relational_id":12747,"identifier":"8.01","token":"8.01","url":"\/8.01\/","edition_id":1,"permalink":0,"preferred":1}}],"structure_contents":[{"id":71526,"structure_id":12887,"section_number":"8.01-34","catch_line":"When contribution among wrongdoers enforced","url":"\/8.01-34\/","token":"8.01\/3\/3\/8.01-34","metadata":false},{"id":56273,"structure_id":12887,"section_number":"8.01-35","catch_line":"Damages for loss of income not diminished by reimbursement","url":"\/8.01-35\/","token":"8.01\/3\/3\/8.01-35","metadata":false},{"id":71789,"structure_id":12887,"section_number":"8.01-35.1","catch_line":"Effect of release or covenant not to sue in respect to liability and contribution","url":"\/8.01-35.1\/","token":"8.01\/3\/3\/8.01-35.1","metadata":false},{"id":54115,"structure_id":12887,"section_number":"8.01-36","catch_line":"Joinder of action of tort to infant with action for recovery of expenses incurred thereby and claim for recovery of expenses by infant","url":"\/8.01-36\/","token":"8.01\/3\/3\/8.01-36","metadata":false},{"id":61407,"structure_id":12887,"section_number":"8.01-37","catch_line":"Recovery of lost wages in action for injuries to emancipated infant","url":"\/8.01-37\/","token":"8.01\/3\/3\/8.01-37","metadata":false},{"id":84122,"structure_id":12887,"section_number":"8.01-37.1","catch_line":"Claims for medical services provided by United States; proof of reasonable value","url":"\/8.01-37.1\/","token":"8.01\/3\/3\/8.01-37.1","metadata":false},{"id":74543,"structure_id":12887,"section_number":"8.01-38","catch_line":"Tort liability of hospitals","url":"\/8.01-38\/","token":"8.01\/3\/3\/8.01-38","metadata":false},{"id":80026,"structure_id":12887,"section_number":"8.01-38.1","catch_line":"Limitation on recovery of punitive damages","url":"\/8.01-38.1\/","token":"8.01\/3\/3\/8.01-38.1","metadata":false},{"id":85786,"structure_id":12887,"section_number":"8.01-39","catch_line":"Completion or acceptance of work not bar to action against independent contractor for personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property","url":"\/8.01-39\/","token":"8.01\/3\/3\/8.01-39","metadata":false},{"id":60815,"structure_id":12887,"section_number":"8.01-40","catch_line":"Unauthorized use of name or picture of any person; punitive damages; statute of limitations","url":"\/8.01-40\/","token":"8.01\/3\/3\/8.01-40","metadata":false},{"id":61512,"structure_id":12887,"section_number":"8.01-40.1","catch_line":"Action for injury resulting from violation of Computer Crimes Act; limitations","url":"\/8.01-40.1\/","token":"8.01\/3\/3\/8.01-40.1","metadata":false},{"id":57683,"structure_id":12887,"section_number":"8.01-40.2","catch_line":"Unsolicited transmission of advertising materials by facsimile machine","url":"\/8.01-40.2\/","token":"8.01\/3\/3\/8.01-40.2","metadata":false},{"id":55073,"structure_id":12887,"section_number":"8.01-40.3","catch_line":"Unauthorized dissemination, etc., of criminal history record information; civil action","url":"\/8.01-40.3\/","token":"8.01\/3\/3\/8.01-40.3","metadata":false},{"id":57913,"structure_id":12887,"section_number":"8.01-40.4","catch_line":"Civil action for unlawful creation of image of another or unlawful dissemination or sale of images of another","url":"\/8.01-40.4\/","token":"8.01\/3\/3\/8.01-40.4","metadata":false},{"id":62242,"structure_id":12887,"section_number":"8.01-40.5","catch_line":"Publishing or distributing material harmful to minors on the Internet","url":"\/8.01-40.5\/","token":"8.01\/3\/3\/8.01-40.5","metadata":false},{"id":75613,"structure_id":12887,"section_number":"8.01-41","catch_line":"Wrongful distraint, attachment","url":"\/8.01-41\/","token":"8.01\/3\/3\/8.01-41","metadata":false},{"id":54575,"structure_id":12887,"section_number":"8.01-42","catch_line":"Loss or injury to clothing in dyeing, dry cleaning, or laundering","url":"\/8.01-42\/","token":"8.01\/3\/3\/8.01-42","metadata":false},{"id":54010,"structure_id":12887,"section_number":"8.01-42.1","catch_line":"Civil action for racial, religious, or ethnic harassment, violence or vandalism","url":"\/8.01-42.1\/","token":"8.01\/3\/3\/8.01-42.1","metadata":false},{"id":71047,"structure_id":12887,"section_number":"8.01-42.2","catch_line":"Liability of guest for hotel damage","url":"\/8.01-42.2\/","token":"8.01\/3\/3\/8.01-42.2","metadata":false},{"id":70599,"structure_id":12887,"section_number":"8.01-42.3","catch_line":"Civil action for stalking","url":"\/8.01-42.3\/","token":"8.01\/3\/3\/8.01-42.3","metadata":false},{"id":80887,"structure_id":12887,"section_number":"8.01-42.4","catch_line":"Civil action for trafficking in persons","url":"\/8.01-42.4\/","token":"8.01\/3\/3\/8.01-42.4","metadata":false},{"id":63928,"structure_id":12887,"section_number":"8.01-42.5","catch_line":"Civil action for female genital mutilation","url":"\/8.01-42.5\/","token":"8.01\/3\/3\/8.01-42.5","metadata":false},{"id":73227,"structure_id":12887,"section_number":"8.01-42.6","catch_line":"Liability of employer for personal injury or death by wrongful act","url":"\/8.01-42.6\/","token":"8.01\/3\/3\/8.01-42.6","metadata":false},{"id":83062,"structure_id":12887,"section_number":"8.01-43","catch_line":"Action against parent for damage to public property by minor","url":"\/8.01-43\/","token":"8.01\/3\/3\/8.01-43","metadata":false},{"id":59911,"structure_id":12887,"section_number":"8.01-44","catch_line":"Action against parent for damage to private property by minor","url":"\/8.01-44\/","token":"8.01\/3\/3\/8.01-44","metadata":false},{"id":73464,"structure_id":12887,"section_number":"8.01-44.1","catch_line":"Immunity from civil liability of members of certain committees, etc","url":"\/8.01-44.1\/","token":"8.01\/3\/3\/8.01-44.1","metadata":false},{"id":72343,"structure_id":12887,"section_number":"8.01-44.2","catch_line":"Action against physician for vaccine-related injury or death","url":"\/8.01-44.2\/","token":"8.01\/3\/3\/8.01-44.2","metadata":false},{"id":78701,"structure_id":12887,"section_number":"8.01-44.3","catch_line":"Divulgence of communications by qualified interpreters and communications assistants","url":"\/8.01-44.3\/","token":"8.01\/3\/3\/8.01-44.3","metadata":false},{"id":83884,"structure_id":12887,"section_number":"8.01-44.4","catch_line":"Action for shoplifting and employee theft","url":"\/8.01-44.4\/","token":"8.01\/3\/3\/8.01-44.4","metadata":false},{"id":81010,"structure_id":12887,"section_number":"8.01-44.5","catch_line":"Punitive damages for persons injured by intoxicated drivers","url":"\/8.01-44.5\/","token":"8.01\/3\/3\/8.01-44.5","metadata":false},{"id":56974,"structure_id":12887,"section_number":"8.01-44.6","catch_line":"Action for injury to cemetery property","url":"\/8.01-44.6\/","token":"8.01\/3\/3\/8.01-44.6","metadata":false},{"id":81782,"structure_id":12887,"section_number":"8.01-44.7","catch_line":"Action for tampering with metering device and diverting service","url":"\/8.01-44.7\/","token":"8.01\/3\/3\/8.01-44.7","metadata":false}],"previous_section":{"id":83884,"structure_id":12887,"section_number":"8.01-44.4","catch_line":"Action for shoplifting and employee theft","url":"\/8.01-44.4\/","token":"8.01\/3\/3\/8.01-44.4","metadata":false},"next_section":{"id":56974,"structure_id":12887,"section_number":"8.01-44.6","catch_line":"Action for injury to cemetery property","url":"\/8.01-44.6\/","token":"8.01\/3\/3\/8.01-44.6","metadata":false},"metadata":false,"official_url":"https:\/\/law.lis.virginia.gov\/vacode\/8.01-44.5\/","history_text":"

This law was first created in 1994. The record of its establishment is cataloged in chapter 570<\/a> of that year\u2019s edition of \u201cActs of Assembly,\u201d the annual state publication listing all changes made to the Code of Virginia in that year. It has been modified 7 times. Those modifications are cataloged by \u201cThe Acts of Assembly,\u201d a state publication, by year and chapter. Those modifications that can be read on the General Assembly\u2019s website will be linked accordingly. Those modifications are as follows: in 1998, chapter 722<\/a>; in 1999, chapter 324<\/a>; in 2002, chapter 879<\/a>; in 2013, chapter 636<\/a>; in 2015, chapter 710<\/a>; in 2016, chapters 510<\/a> and 624<\/a>; in 2017, chapters 623<\/a> and 671<\/a>.<\/p>","references":false,"refers_to":[{"id":63409,"section_number":"18.2-268.1","catch_line":"Chemical testing to determine alcohol or drug content of blood; definitions","order_by":null,"url":"\/18.2-268.1\/"},{"id":55454,"section_number":"18.2-268.12","catch_line":"Ordinances","order_by":null,"url":"\/18.2-268.12\/"},{"id":74659,"section_number":"18.2-268.2","catch_line":"Implied consent to post-arrest testing to determine drug or alcohol content of blood","order_by":null,"url":"\/18.2-268.2\/"},{"id":54870,"section_number":"18.2-268.3","catch_line":"Refusal of tests; penalties; procedures","order_by":null,"url":"\/18.2-268.3\/"},{"id":75295,"section_number":"18.2-268.5","catch_line":"Qualifications and liability of persons authorized to take blood sample; procedure for taking samples","order_by":null,"url":"\/18.2-268.5\/"},{"id":69540,"section_number":"18.2-268.6","catch_line":"Transmission of blood samples","order_by":null,"url":"\/18.2-268.6\/"},{"id":84208,"section_number":"18.2-268.7","catch_line":"Transmission of blood test samples; use as evidence","order_by":null,"url":"\/18.2-268.7\/"},{"id":72188,"section_number":"18.2-268.9","catch_line":"Assurance of breath-test validity; use of breath-test results as evidence","order_by":null,"url":"\/18.2-268.9\/"}],"permalink":{"id":280813,"object_type":"law","relational_id":81010,"identifier":"8.01-44.5","token":"8.01\/3\/3\/8.01-44.5","url":"\/8.01-44.5\/","edition_id":1,"permalink":0,"preferred":1},"url":"\/8.01-44.5\/","token":"8.01\/3\/3\/8.01-44.5","dublin_core":{"Title":"Punitive damages for persons injured by intoxicated drivers","Type":"Text","Format":"text\/html","Identifier":"\u00a7 8.01-44.5","Relation":"Code of Virginia"},"html":"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t

In any action<\/span> for personal injury or death arising from the operation of a motor vehicle, engine or train, the finder of fact<\/span> may, in its discretion, award punitive damages<\/span> to the plaintiff<\/span> if the evidence<\/span> proves that the defendant<\/span> acted with malice<\/span> toward the plaintiff<\/span> or the defendant<\/span>’s conduct was so willful or wanton as to show a conscious disregard for the rights of others.\n\t\tA defendant<\/span>’s conduct shall be deemed sufficiently willful or wanton as to show a conscious disregard for the rights of others when the evidence<\/span> proves that (i) when the incident causing the injury or death occurred, the defendant<\/span> had a blood alcohol concentration of 0.15 percent or more by weight by volume or 0.15 grams or more per 210 liters of breath; (ii) at the time the defendant<\/span> began drinking alcohol, or during the time he was drinking alcohol, he knew or should have known that his ability to operate a motor vehicle, engine or train would be impaired, or when he was operating a motor vehicle he knew or should have known that his ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired; and (iii) the defendant<\/span>’s intoxication was a proximate cause of the injury to or death of the plaintiff<\/span>. For the purposes of clause (i), it shall be rebuttably presumed that the blood alcohol concentration at the time of the incident causing injury or death was at least as high as the test result as shown in a certificate issued pursuant to \u00a7 18.2-268.9<\/a>, in a certificate of analysis for a blood test administered pursuant to \u00a7 18.2-268.7<\/a>, provided that the test was administered in accordance with the provisions of \u00a7\u00a7 18.2-268.1<\/a> through 18.2-268.12<\/a>, or in a certificate of analysis for a test performed by the Department of Forensic Science on whole blood drawn pursuant to a search warrant<\/span>, provided that the test was administered in accordance with the provisions of \u00a7\u00a7 18.2-268.5<\/a>, 18.2-268.6<\/a>, and 18.2-268.7<\/a>. In addition to any other forms of proof, a party<\/span> may submit a copy of a certificate issued pursuant to \u00a7 18.2-268.9<\/a>, a certificate of analysis for a blood test administered pursuant to \u00a7 18.2-268.7<\/a>, or a certificate of analysis for a test performed by the Department of Forensic Science on whole blood drawn pursuant to a search warrant<\/span>, which shall be prima facie evidence<\/span> of the facts<\/span> contained therein and compliance with the applicable provisions of \u00a7\u00a7 18.2-268.1<\/a> through 18.2-268.12<\/a>. For the purposes of clause (ii), it shall be rebuttably presumed that the defendant<\/span> who has consumed alcohol knew or should have known that his ability to operate a motor vehicle, engine, or train was or would be impaired by such consumption of alcohol.\n\t\tHowever, when a defendant<\/span> has unreasonably refused to submit to a test of his blood alcohol content as required by \u00a7 18.2-268.2<\/a>, a defendant<\/span>’s conduct shall be deemed sufficiently willful or wanton as to show a conscious disregard for the rights of others when the evidence<\/span> proves that (a) when the incident causing the injury or death occurred the defendant<\/span> was intoxicated, which may be established by evidence<\/span> concerning the conduct or condition of the defendant<\/span>; (b) at the time the defendant<\/span> began drinking alcohol, during the time he was drinking alcohol, or when he was operating a motor vehicle, he knew or should have known that his ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired; and (c) the defendant<\/span>’s intoxication was a proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff<\/span> or death of the plaintiff<\/span>’s decedent. In addition to any other forms of proof, a party<\/span> may submit a certified copy of a court<\/span>’s determination of unreasonable refusal pursuant to \u00a7 18.2-268.3<\/a>, which shall be prima facie evidence<\/span> that the defendant<\/span> unreasonably refused to submit to the test. For the purposes of clause (b), it shall be rebuttably presumed that the defendant<\/span> who has consumed alcohol knew or should have known that his ability to operate a motor vehicle, engine, or train was or would be impaired by such consumption of alcohol.\n\t\tEvidence<\/span> of similar conduct by the same defendant<\/span> subsequent to the date of the personal injury or death arising from the operation of a motor vehicle, engine, or train shall be admissible<\/span> at trial<\/span> for consideration by the jury<\/span> or other finder of fact<\/span> for the limited purpose of determining what amount of punitive damages<\/span> may be appropriate to deter the defendant<\/span> and others from similar future action<\/span>.<\/p><\/section>","plain_text":" CODE OF VIRGINIA\n\nPUNITIVE DAMAGES FOR PERSONS INJURED BY INTOXICATED DRIVERS (\u00a7 8.01-44.5)\n\nIn any action for personal injury or death arising from the operation of a motor\nvehicle, engine or train, the finder of fact may, in its discretion, award\npunitive damages to the plaintiff if the evidence proves that the defendant\nacted with malice toward the plaintiff or the defendant’s conduct was so\nwillful or wanton as to show a conscious disregard for the rights of others.\n\t\tA defendant’s conduct shall be deemed sufficiently willful or wanton as\nto show a conscious disregard for the rights of others when the evidence proves\nthat (i) when the incident causing the injury or death occurred, the defendant\nhad a blood alcohol concentration of 0.15 percent or more by weight by volume or\n0.15 grams or more per 210 liters of breath; (ii) at the time the defendant\nbegan drinking alcohol, or during the time he was drinking alcohol, he knew or\nshould have known that his ability to operate a motor vehicle, engine or train\nwould be impaired, or when he was operating a motor vehicle he knew or should\nhave known that his ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired; and (iii)\nthe defendant’s intoxication was a proximate cause of the injury to or\ndeath of the plaintiff. For the purposes of clause (i), it shall be rebuttably\npresumed that the blood alcohol concentration at the time of the incident\ncausing injury or death was at least as high as the test result as shown in a\ncertificate issued pursuant to \u00a7 18.2-268.9, in a certificate of analysis for a\nblood test administered pursuant to \u00a7 18.2-268.7, provided that the test was\nadministered in accordance with the provisions of \u00a7\u00a7 18.2-268.1 through\n18.2-268.12, or in a certificate of analysis for a test performed by the\nDepartment of Forensic Science on whole blood drawn pursuant to a search\nwarrant, provided that the test was administered in accordance with the\nprovisions of \u00a7\u00a7 18.2-268.5, 18.2-268.6, and 18.2-268.7. In addition to any\nother forms of proof, a party may submit a copy of a certificate issued pursuant\nto \u00a7 18.2-268.9, a certificate of analysis for a blood test administered\npursuant to \u00a7 18.2-268.7, or a certificate of analysis for a test performed by\nthe Department of Forensic Science on whole blood drawn pursuant to a search\nwarrant, which shall be prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein and\ncompliance with the applicable provisions of \u00a7\u00a7 18.2-268.1 through\n18.2-268.12. For the purposes of clause (ii), it shall be rebuttably presumed\nthat the defendant who has consumed alcohol knew or should have known that his\nability to operate a motor vehicle, engine, or train was or would be impaired by\nsuch consumption of alcohol.\n\t\tHowever, when a defendant has unreasonably refused to submit to a test of his\nblood alcohol content as required by \u00a7 18.2-268.2, a defendant’s conduct\nshall be deemed sufficiently willful or wanton as to show a conscious disregard\nfor the rights of others when the evidence proves that (a) when the incident\ncausing the injury or death occurred the defendant was intoxicated, which may be\nestablished by evidence concerning the conduct or condition of the defendant;\n(b) at the time the defendant began drinking alcohol, during the time he was\ndrinking alcohol, or when he was operating a motor vehicle, he knew or should\nhave known that his ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired; and (c) the\ndefendant’s intoxication was a proximate cause of the injury to the\nplaintiff or death of the plaintiff’s decedent. In addition to any other\nforms of proof, a party may submit a certified copy of a court’s\ndetermination of unreasonable refusal pursuant to \u00a7 18.2-268.3, which shall be\nprima facie evidence that the defendant unreasonably refused to submit to the\ntest. For the purposes of clause (b), it shall be rebuttably presumed that the\ndefendant who has consumed alcohol knew or should have known that his ability to\noperate a motor vehicle, engine, or train was or would be impaired by such\nconsumption of alcohol.\n\t\tEvidence of similar conduct by the same defendant subsequent to the date of\nthe personal injury or death arising from the operation of a motor vehicle,\nengine, or train shall be admissible at trial for consideration by the jury or\nother finder of fact for the limited purpose of determining what amount of\npunitive damages may be appropriate to deter the defendant and others from\nsimilar future action.\n\nHISTORY: 1994, c. 570; 1998, c. 722; 1999, c. 324; 2002, c. 879; 2013, c. 636;\n2015, c. 710; 2016, cc. 510, 624; 2017, cc. 623, 671.","edition":{"id":1,"name":"2025","slug":"2025","date_created":"2026-06-21 22:39:22","date_modified":"2026-06-21 22:39:22","current":1,"order_by":1,"last_import":null}}