                                 CODE OF VIRGINIA

SUSPENSION OR TOLLING OF STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS; EFFECT OF DISABILITIES; EFFECT
OF DEATH; INJUNCTION; PREVENTION OF SERVICE BY DEFENDANT; DISMISSAL, NONSUIT OR
ABATEMENT; DEVISE FOR PAYMENT OF DEBTS; NEW PROMISES; DEBTS PROVED IN
CREDITORS&#8217; SUITS (§ 8.01-229)

A. Disabilities which toll the statute of limitations. — Except as otherwise
specifically provided in §§ 8.01-237, 8.01-241, 8.01-242, 8.01-243, 8.01-243.1
and other provisions of this Code,

   1. If a person entitled to bring any action is at the time the cause of action
   accrues an infant, except if such infant has been emancipated pursuant to
   Article 15 (&#xA7; 16.1-331 et seq.) of Chapter 11 of Title 16.1, or
   incapacitated, such person may bring it within the prescribed limitation
   period after such disability is removed; or

   2. After a cause of action accrues,
   				a. If an infant becomes entitled to bring such action, the time during
   which he is within the age of minority shall not be counted as any part of the
   period within which the action must be brought except as to any such period
   during which the infant has been judicially declared emancipated; or
   				b. If a person entitled to bring such action becomes incapacitated, the
   time during which he is incapacitated shall not be computed as any part of the
   period within which the action must be brought, except where a conservator,
   guardian or committee is appointed for such person in which case an action may
   be commenced by such conservator, committee or guardian before the expiration
   of the applicable period of limitation or within one year after his
   qualification as such, whichever occurs later.
   				For the purposes of subdivisions 1 and 2, a person shall be deemed
   incapacitated if he is so adjudged by a court of competent jurisdiction, or if
   it shall otherwise appear to the court or jury determining the issue that such
   person is or was incapacitated within the prescribed limitation period.

   3. If a convict is or becomes entitled to bring an action against his
   committee, the time during which he is incarcerated shall not be counted as
   any part of the period within which the action must be brought.

B. Effect of death of a party. — The death of a person entitled to bring an
action or of a person against whom an action may be brought shall toll the
statute of limitations as follows:

   1. Death of person entitled to bring a personal action. &#x2014; If a person
   entitled to bring a personal action dies with no such action pending before
   the expiration of the limitation period for commencement thereof, then an
   action may be commenced by the decedent&#8217;s personal representative before
   the expiration of the limitation period including the limitation period as
   provided by subdivision E 3 or within one year after his qualification as
   personal representative, whichever occurs later.

   2. Death of person against whom personal action may be brought.
   				a. If a person against whom a personal action may be brought dies before
   the commencement of such action and before the expiration of the limitation
   period for commencement thereof then a claim may be filed against the
   decedent&#8217;s estate or an action may be commenced against the
   decedent&#8217;s personal representative before the expiration of the
   applicable limitation period or within one year after the qualification of
   such personal representative, whichever occurs later.
   				b. If a person against whom a personal action may be brought dies before
   suit papers naming such person as defendant have been filed with the court,
   then such suit papers may be amended to substitute the decedent&#8217;s
   personal representative as party defendant before the expiration of the
   applicable limitation period or within two years after the date such suit
   papers were filed with the court, whichever occurs later, and such suit papers
   shall be taken as properly filed.

   3. Effect of death on actions for recovery of realty, or a proceeding for
   enforcement of certain liens relating to realty. &#x2014; Upon the death of
   any person in whose favor or against whom an action for recovery of realty, or
   a proceeding for enforcement of certain liens relating to realty, may be
   brought, such right of action shall accrue to or against his successors in
   interest as provided in Article 2 (&#xA7; 8.01-236 et seq.).

   4. Accrual of a personal cause of action against the estate of any person
   subsequent to such person&#8217;s death. &#x2014; If a personal cause of
   action against a decedent accrues subsequent to his death, an action may be
   brought against the decedent&#8217;s personal representative or a claim
   thereon may be filed against the estate of such decedent before the expiration
   of the applicable limitation period or within two years after the
   qualification of the decedent&#8217;s personal representative, whichever
   occurs later.

   5. Accrual of a personal cause of action in favor of decedent. &#x2014; If a
   person dies before a personal cause of action which survives would have
   accrued to him, if he had continued to live, then an action may be commenced
   by such decedent&#8217;s personal representative before the expiration of the
   applicable limitation period or within one year after the qualification of
   such personal representative, whichever occurs later.

   6. Delayed qualification of personal representative. &#x2014; If there is an
   interval of more than two years between the death of any person in whose favor
   or against whom a cause of action has accrued or shall subsequently accrue and
   the qualification of such person&#8217;s personal representative, such
   personal representative shall, for the purposes of this chapter, be deemed to
   have qualified on the last day of such two-year period.

C. Suspension during injunctions. &#x2014; When the commencement of any action
is stayed by injunction, the time of the continuance of the injunction shall not
be computed as any part of the period within which the action must be brought.

D. Obstruction of filing by defendant. &#x2014; When the filing of an action is
obstructed by a defendant&#8217;s (i) filing a petition in bankruptcy or filing
a petition for an extension or arrangement under the United States Bankruptcy
Act or (ii) using any other direct or indirect means to obstruct the filing of
an action, then the time that such obstruction has continued shall not be
counted as any part of the period within which the action must be brought.

E. Dismissal, abatement, or nonsuit.

   1. Except as provided in subdivision 3, if any action is commenced within the
   prescribed limitation period and for any cause abates or is dismissed without
   determining the merits, the time such action is pending shall not be computed
   as part of the period within which such action may be brought, and another
   action may be brought within the remaining period.

   2. If a judgment or decree is rendered for the plaintiff in any action
   commenced within the prescribed limitation period and such judgment or decree
   is arrested or reversed upon a ground which does not preclude a new action for
   the same cause, or if there is occasion to bring a new action by reason of the
   loss or destruction of any of the papers or records in a former action which
   was commenced within the prescribed limitation period, then a new action may
   be brought within one year after such arrest or reversal or such loss or
   destruction, but not after.

   3. If a plaintiff suffers a voluntary nonsuit as prescribed in &#xA7;
   8.01-380, the statute of limitations with respect to such action shall be
   tolled by the commencement of the nonsuited action, regardless of whether the
   statute of limitations is statutory or contractual, and the plaintiff may
   recommence his action within six months from the date of the order entered by
   the court, or within the original period of limitation, or within the
   limitation period as provided by subdivision B 1, whichever period is longer.
   This tolling provision shall apply irrespective of whether the action is
   originally filed in a federal or a state court and recommenced in any other
   court, and shall apply to all actions irrespective of whether they arise under
   common law or statute.

F. Effect of devise for payment of debts. &#x2014; No provision in the will of
any testator devising his real estate, or any part thereof, subject to the
payment of his debts or charging the same therewith, or containing any other
provision for the payment of debts, shall prevent this chapter from operating
against such debts, unless it plainly appears to be the testator&#8217;s intent
that it shall not so operate.

G. Effect of new promise in writing.

   1. If any person against whom a right of action has accrued on any contract,
   other than a judgment or recognizance, promises, by writing signed by him or
   his agent, payment of money on such contract, the person to whom the right has
   accrued may maintain an action for the money so promised, within such number
   of years after such promise as it might be maintained if such promise were the
   original cause of action. An acknowledgment in writing, from which a promise
   of payment may be implied, shall be deemed to be such promise within the
   meaning of this subsection.

   2. The plaintiff may sue on the new promise described in subdivision 1 or on
   the original cause of action, except that when the new promise is of such a
   nature as to merge the original cause of action then the action shall be only
   on the new promise.

H. Suspension of limitations in creditors&#8217; suits. &#x2014; When an action
is commenced as a general creditors&#8217; action, or as a general lien
creditors&#8217; action, or as an action to enforce a mechanics&#8217; lien, the
running of the statute of limitations shall be suspended as to debts provable in
such action from the commencement of the action, provided they are brought in
before the commissioner in chancery under the first reference for an account of
debts; but as to claims not so brought in the statute shall continue to run,
without interruption by reason either of the commencement of the action or of
the order for an account, until a later order for an account, under which they
do come in, or they are asserted by petition or independent action.
			In actions not instituted originally either as general creditors&#8217;
actions, or as general lien creditors&#8217; actions, but which become such by
subsequent proceedings, the statute of limitations shall be suspended by an
order of reference for an account of debts or of liens only as to those
creditors who come in and prove their claims under the order. As to creditors
who come in afterwards by petition or under an order of recommittal, or a later
order of reference for an account, the statute shall continue to run without
interruption by reason of previous orders until filing of the petition, or until
the date of the reference under which they prove their claims, as the case may
be.

I. When an action is commenced within a period of 30 days prior to the
expiration of the limitation period for commencement thereof and the defending
party or parties desire to institute an action as third-party plaintiff against
one or more persons not party to the original action, the running of the period
of limitation against such action shall be suspended as to such new party for a
period of 60 days from the expiration of the applicable limitation period.

J. If any award of compensation by the Workers&#8217; Compensation Commission
pursuant to Chapter 5 (&#xA7; 65.2-500 et seq.) of Title 65.2 is subsequently
found void ab initio, other than an award voided for fraudulent procurement of
the award by the claimant, the statute of limitations applicable to any civil
action upon the same claim or cause of action in a court of this Commonwealth
shall be tolled for that period of time during which compensation payments were
made.

K. Suspension of limitations during criminal proceedings. &#x2014; In any
personal action for damages or action for death by wrongful act pursuant to
&#xA7; 8.01-50, if a criminal prosecution arising out of the same facts is
commenced, the time such prosecution is pending shall not be computed as part of
the period within which such a civil action may be brought. For purposes of this
subsection, the time during which a prosecution is pending shall be calculated
from the date of the issuance of a warrant, summons, or capias, the return or
filing of an indictment or information, or the defendant&#8217;s first
appearance in any court as an accused in such a prosecution, whichever date
occurs first, until the date of the final judgment or order in the trial court,
the date of the final disposition of any direct appeal, or the date on which the
time for noting an appeal has expired, whichever date occurs last. Thereafter,
the civil action may be brought within the remaining period of the statute or
within one year, whichever is longer.
			If a criminal prosecution is commenced and a grand jury indictment is
returned or a grand jury indictment is waived after the period within which a
civil action arising out of the same set of facts may be brought, a civil action
may be brought within one year of the date of the final judgment or order in the
trial court, the date of the final disposition of any direct appeal, or the date
on which the time for noting an appeal has expired, whichever date occurs last,
but no more than 10 years after the date of the crime or two years after the
cause of action shall have accrued, whichever date occurs last.

HISTORY: Code 1950, §§ 8-8, 8-13, 8-15, 8-20, 8-21, 8-25, 8-26, 8-29 through
8-34; 1964, c. 219; 1966, c. 118; 1972, c. 825; 1977, c. 617; 1978, cc. 65, 767;
1983, cc. 404, 437; 1986, c. 506; 1987, cc. 294, 645; 1988, c. 711; 1989, c.
588; 1990, c. 280; 1991, cc. 693, 722; 1993, c. 844; 1997, c. 801; 2000, c. 531;
2001, cc. 773, 781; 2016, cc. 189, 268; 2025, c. 37.